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Kripke’s well known puzzle about belief can be portrayed as a puzzle about reasoning. We observe Pierre, a monolingual and untravelled Frenchman perusing in Paris many pictures of London and delightedly exclaiming ‘Londres est jolie’. So we (readers of The Reasoner) accept:

1.	Pierre believes that London is pretty.

Next, we observe Pierre move to London (not realising it to be the town he has been calling ‘Londres’), pick up English through immersion, and, on the basis of what he sees, dejectedly and repeatedly mutter ‘London is not pretty’ (a verdict with which his new neighbours heartily concur). So we accept

2.	It is not the case that Pierre believes that London is pretty.

We reckon ourselves to be good reasoners, not liable to accepting flat-out contradictions. Yet here we are accepting 1. and 2.!
	In response to this problem Cristian Constantinescu suggested that ‘Londres’, in Pierre’s idiolect, does not mean ‘London’ and thus that we are wrong to translate his delighted exclamation as ‘London is pretty’ and hence wrong to use 1. to report his belief. I criticised this on the grounds that, as Kripke insists, Pierre uses ‘Londres’ in the same way as his compatriots, and ‘London’ in the same way as the English do. [I’ll use ‘(C1)’, ‘(G1)’ and ‘(C2)’ to label, respectively, Constantinescu’s first piece, my reply and his rejoinder in The Reasoner, 1(4):8-9; 1(5):4-5; 1(7):5-6, 2007.]
There is, I believe, a perfectly straightforward solution to Kripke’s puzzle that can be brought out by considering which of the following is the more accurate report of the belief that Pierre held while in Paris:

1a. Pierre believes that London (the parts he has seen in pictures) is pretty.

1b. Pierre believes that London (the whole city) is pretty.

According to me, then, even if I translate Pierre’s Paris exclamation as ‘London is pretty’, this does not constrain me to use 1. to report his belief, because generally a person gives only rough verbal expression to his/her beliefs. Constantinescu, by contrast, sees the solution to Kripke’s puzzle as turning on a principle about translation, namely that it must preserve cognitive content. Looking at his two examples of translation in (C2) will be instructive.
	Discussing the first of these, Constantinescu says that ‘we would normally have no qualms’ about translating inside its quotation marks. The example is:





The city that we nowadays call ‘London’ is situated on the site of an ancient Roman settlement called ‘Londinium’.

But Constantinescu thinks that a good translation, apart from preserving cognitive content, must also preserve truth-value – and clearly his translation here may not, for the original is about the habits of French speakers (‘nous’) the proposed translation about the habits of English speakers (‘we’). It is easy to imagine tokens of both sentences being used in some possible world in which English speakers don’t use ‘London’, but call London ‘The Smoke’. Indexicals pose a problem for translators — how, for example, should we translate ‘Cette phrase est en anglais’ so as to preserve truth-value?
	Constantinescu’s second example is designed to show that, for some non-quotational contexts, translating each word would make for a bad translation. His example (we imagine Pierre saying this on discovering that what he now calls ‘London’ is what he previously called ‘Londres’):

Je viens de découvrir qu’on peut être simultanément à Londres et à London.

Constantinescu’s point is that, if we translated that ‘Londres’ as ‘London’ our translation would, misleadingly, have ‘Pierre foolishly rejoicing in the discovery of a trivial a priori truth’, and so he recommends that, in translating, we leave the ‘Londres’ untouched. The first problem with this is that what we would end up with is not a translation but a mish-mash of English and French. (The original is too, but the speaker can get away with it because he is bilingual — which the person for whom we are providing the translation may not be.) Second, according to Constantinescu, the utterance in question ‘is clearly a statement about objects, not names’. Well, the utterance is about one city under two different names. To see this, try translating it for the benefit of a monolingual Irish person. It would not do, for Constantinescu’s reason, to render both the ‘Londres’ and the ‘London’ into Irish. The best translation (for help with which, I thank Arthur Keaveney) would be:

Tá mé díreach anois tar éis a fháil amach gur féidir le duine bheith ag an am chéana san áit ar a dtugtar ‘Londres’ na Fraincís agus san áit ar a dtugtar ‘London’ i mBéarla.

which translates back into English as:

I have just discovered that one can be at the same time in the place called ‘Londres’ in French and in the place called ‘London’ in English.

In this case, the translator has to look beyond the words of the speaker to the (probable) content of his utterance.
What this shows is what is known to all professional translators — that a faithful translation cannot always be concise, and the same is true a fortiori of a faithful report of someone’s belief, for here what we are trying to convey is the content of that belief. Hence 1a. or 1b. in contrast to 1..  If it is 1a. that faithfully reports Pierre’s belief, then there is no inconsistency between that and 

2a. It is not the case that Pierre believes that London (the parts he has seen in London) is pretty.

On the other hand, if it is 1b. that faithfully reports Pierre’s belief, then, if his London-based belief is also about the whole city, we are correct to report that belief as

2b. Pierre believes that London (the whole city) is not pretty.

With 1b. and 2b., we are consistently reporting Pierre’s beliefs, and these are inconsistent due to the fact, as I pointed out in (G1), that his inductive reasoning is merde.




